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1. IntroductionConcerns over the exercise of
authorities to impose forward con
1 See Wolfram (1999) for a description o
2 For instance, VPPs have been used in t
EDF/Direct Energy in 2007, or in the abuse o
market more competitive. For a description a
unconventional forms of forward contracts h
by firms in antitrust lawsuits, see Borensteinreflects important institutional and structural features of electricity markets. We
that, when firms are asymmetric, the distribution of contracts among firms matt
the case of a single dominant firm, the regulator can be confident that allo
contracts to that firm will be pro competitive. However, when asymmetries ar
extreme, certain contract allocations might yield anti competitive outcomes by
inating more competitive equilibria. Our analysis thus suggests that forward con
should be allocated so as to (virtually) reduce asymmetries across firms.market power in electricity markets have led several competition and regulatory
tract commitments on the dominant producers. Such contracts have taken various
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eliverforms, but they all have one important feature in common: they commit producers to receive a fixed price for a ce
fraction of their output before wholesale market competition takes place. The ‘vesting contracts’ introduce
privatization in the British electricity market or the ‘Competition Transition Costs’ for stranded costs recovery in S
provide two well known examples of such forward commitments.1 More recently, several regulators worldwide have
forcing large electricity producers to auction off ‘virtual power plants’ (VPPs), which essentially work as forward
VPPs have also been used as antitrust remedies in several competition policy cases, including merger control procee
and abuse of dominance investigations.2 More generally, several authors have blamed the poor performance of
electricity markets on the lack of sufficient forward contracting, and propose to foster it for these markets to d
efficient outcomes (Wolak, 2012; Bushnell et al., 2008).
n Corresponding author. Tel.: þ34 91 6249600; fax: þ34 91 6249329.
E-mail address: frutos@eco.uc3m.es (M.-A´. de Frutos).f the first, and Fabra and Toro (2005) and Ku¨hn and Machado (2006) for a description of the second.
he merger cases EDF/EnBW in 2000 and Nuon/Reliant in 2003, in the alleged price-squeeze case involving
f dominance by ENEL in 2006. In Spain and Portugal, VPPs have also been used in an attempt to make the
nd analysis of VPPs, see Ausubel and Cramton (2010), Federico and Lo´pez (2009) and Schultz (2009). Some
ave been used in other competition policy settings, such as certain voluntary operating restrictions adopted
(1996).
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Despite the policy activity surrounding the use of forward contracts, there has been relatively little exploration of what
the optimal set of forward contract commitments might be. This paper addresses this topic by modelling the interplay of
forward contracts with equilibrium outcomes in auction based spot markets. The key result is that the allocation of
contracts among firms is a critical issue when firms are asymmetric. For instance, whereas it is pro competitive to force
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d to allthe dominant producers to selling forward contracts, it is anti competitive to impose such obligation on medium
firms. Similarly, encouraging the medium sized firms to purchase forward contracts is pro competitive, but allowin
dominant producers to do so is anti competitive.3
In practice, forward obligations are typically imposed on large producers to prevent them from exploiting their m
power the main examples being the VPPs on EDF in France, and the VPPs on Endesa and Iberdrola in Spain. How
there are also instances in which forward obligations are imposed on medium sized firms a recent example bein
VPP proposed as a remedy of the merger between Gas Natural and Unio´n Fenosa in Spain. Also, it is not common pra
that competitors of dominant firms are encouraged or obliged to buy forward contracts on the contrary, in some
they are not even allowed to do so, as in the VPPs in Spain and the Netherlands.4 Our paper thus suggests that for
contract obligations could potentially be a more effective tool than currently used in practice.
Our analysis reflects important institutional and structural features of electricity markets. Firstly, firms compe
submitting supply functions with a finite number of steps, as it is the case in many electricity markets in prac
secondly, firms own a portfolio of several production technologies, thus giving rise to (weakly) increasing margina
functions that might differ across firms; and thirdly, firms are allowed to hold exogenously given forward contracts, w
are financially settled once the market closes.6
Despite the complexity of the problem, we show that all the equilibria have a simple pattern: all firms but one (ref
to as non price setters) behave as price takers, i.e., they produce the same as if they bid at marginal costs, whil
remaining firm (referred to as the price setter) sets the price at the level that maximizes its profits over the res
demand (Theorem 1).7 Therefore, there are as many candidate equilibrium outcomes as firms in the market, all of w
differ in the identity of the price setter. Nevertheless, not all candidate equilibria might be sustainable. A price taker m
have incentives to deviate from any candidate equilibria at which the price setter chooses a very low price: by deviat
would lose output, but such output loss might be more than compensated by the price increase. This limits the set of
that can act as price setters in equilibrium. The equilibrium set is nevertheless non empty, as no firm wants to de
from the highest price candidate equilibrium. In general, the resulting equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked as, all else e
firms prefer to be non price setters rather than price setters.
The main results of the paper are contained in Proposition 4, which shows that the impact of forward contrac
equilibrium prices derives from two effects: the change in the price setter’s profit maximizing price and the change i
non price setters’ deviation incentives. On the one hand, the price setter’s profit maximizing price is lower with con
given that market prices only affect its uncovered sales. On the other hand, a lower price also makes it more attractive
non price setter to deviate to a higher price. If contracts are symmetrically distributed across symmetric firms, the
relevant effect of contracts is the one on the price setter’s profit maximizing price. Hence, an increase in contracts
firms’ competitive quantities is unambiguously pro competitive. However, this prediction may be reversed when firm
asymmetric, as the effects of contracts on the non price setters’ deviation incentives, and thus on equilibrium exist
start to play a role. Indeed, a novel result from the paper namely, that an increase in the contract coverage of the p
setter can lead to higher prices comes exactly from the impact of contracts on equilibrium existence. The increase i
price setter’s contract coverage, which lowers its profit maximizing price, may trigger a deviation by some other firm
making such equilibrium disappear. This result is therefore related to a shrinking of the set of equilibrium outcomes a
not a standard type of comparative static result.
The above conclusions support the main message of the paper: since contract distribution and contract volum
crucial in determining the effects of forward contracts, there is scope for making them pro competitive. In markets
large asymmetries across firms, only the dominant firm should be forced to hold forward contracts; getting con
volume right is less critical, as contracts in this case would at worst be ineffective. Regulators should be more cautio
the presence of mild asymmetries between large and medium sized firms, as it is in such cases when the potential
competitive effects of contracts are more likely to arise. Still, it is in these contexts when contracts may have a str
role to play, as encouraging the smaller firms to purchase such contracts may further mitigate the market pow
dominant firms.
3 These suggestions go in line with Ausubel and Cramton’s (2010), who argue that the ‘‘buyers of VPP contracts are ideally competitors’’, and t
main distinction between VPPs and forward markets is that the former ‘‘are normally placed on the dominant firm’’, while the latter ‘‘should exten
generators.’’
4 ´The medium-sized firms EDP and Union Fenosa were not allowed to participate in the Spanish VPPs. Similarly, Electrabel and Essent were not
initially allowed to participate in the VPPs in the Netherlands (Essent objected to being excluded from the auction and the court finally allowed it to
participate).
5 An exception is the Nord Pool, where bidders submit piecewise linear bid functions.
6 Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) also study auctions where bidders have exogenously given forward contracts. However, in that paper short-sellers
face the risk of being squeezed in the secondary market, thus affecting the auction itself. Short-squeezes are not an issue in our setting as electricity
markets are typically very liquid and most contracts are settled by differences with respect to the spot market price.
7 Using data from the UK electricity market, Crawford et al. (2007) have shown that this pattern of asymmetric bidding is observed in practice.
2
In order to illustrate our theoretical results, we have performed a simulation exercise that uses a rich data set of the
Spanish electricity market. Assuming that contract volume remains fixed while demand varies over the year, the analysis
shows that the pro competitive effect of contracts dominates over the anti competitive one. Still, the latter shows up in
the simulations at certain hours, depending on contract volume and contract allocation.
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an beThere is already a large body of theoretical work on the impact of forward trading on the performance of oligopo
markets.8 However, existing papers are not fully applicable to the problem at hand, to the extent that they assume th
ante symmetric firms choose their contracts prior to competing either a la Cournot (Allaz and Vila, 1993; Bushnell, 2
or a la Bertrand (Mahenc and Salanie´, 2004).9 Instead, forward contract commitments are not endogenously chos
firms but rather imposed by regulators. Also, costs and capacity asymmetries are pervasive among electricity produ
These two differences explain why and when our predictions differ. In the existing papers, and regardless of whether
compete a la Cournot or a la Bertrand, forward sales (purchases) induce firms to compete (less) more fiercely given
spot market prices only affect their net selling (net buying) positions. However, once contracts are endogenized
Cournot model predicts that contracts are pro competitive because all firms are net sellers at the subgame p
equilibrium, whereas the opposite holds true under the Bertrand model. In contrast, our model predicts that exogen
given contracts might have anti competitive effects even if firms are net sellers.
As a by product, our analysis also contributes to the literature on share auctions. In a common value setting, W
(1979) shows that there exist equilibria with prices below the common value. Kremer and Nyborg (2004) demonstrat
these kind of equilibria can be eliminated in a discrete setting, similar to the one employed in the current paper, w
quantities must be discrete though prices need not. Restricting bidders to submit a finite number of price quantity
implies that there is a positive mass at the margin, so that competition for the margin destroys the underpricing equi
found by Wilson. In the current paper, in contrast, bidders can exploit the fact that (weakly) increasing marginal cost
to downward sloping residual demand functions, in the same way as bidders can engage in demand reduction in a se
a la Wilson (see also Ausubel and Cramton, 2002). In sum, by relaxing the flat common value assumption, our
recovers the inefficiencies in Wilson in a discrete setting a la Kremer and Nyborg.10
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general model, a simple example of which is solv
Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the general model, including the characterization of firms’ op
behavior, equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium existence and multiplicity, and the impact of forward contracts. Sect
contains a simulation exercise, while Section 6 concludes.
2. Description of the model
We consider a model in which NZ2 firms compete to supply a perfectly divisible good. Market demand, DðpÞ, c
either price inelastic or downward sloping, D0ðpÞr0, and its inverse function is denoted P(q).
sts of
st be
cross
left
sume
ricity
ction
rket
), and
pairs
sume
,
ricity
own
(2008),
oosing
2006),Firm n’s productive capacity Kn, n¼ 1, . . . ,N, is made up of several units. Each unit has constant marginal co
production up to its capacity limit. We impose no constraints on the number of units firms have (other than it mu
finite), and allow for all types of asymmetries (both in size and cost) among the units owned by a firm, as well as a
firms. By stacking firm n’s units in increasing cost order, we construct its marginal cost curve, cnðqÞ, which is a
continuous non decreasing step function. We use Cn(q) to denote firm n’s cost function, i.e., CnðqÞ ¼
R q
0 cnðzÞ dz. We as
that aggregate capacity in the market is always enough to cover total demand. In line with the literature on elect
auctions, we assume that information on firms’ costs is complete because electricity generators share similar produ
technologies, and are thus well aware of the efficiencies of their plants and the cost of the fuels.
Firms compete by simultaneously submitting a finite number of price quantity pairs. Prices cannot exceed the ‘ma
reserve price’ pR (which, for simplicity but without loss of generality, is assumed to exceed the highest marginal cost
firms cannot produce above their capacities. Note that restricting firms to submit a finite number of price quantity
implies that firms’ strategies are left continuous non decreasing step functions with a finite number of steps. We as
that both the ‘‘height’’ (prices) and ‘‘length’’ (quantities) of the steps are continuous choice variables.
By ordering firms’ price quantity pairs in increasing price order, we construct their bid functions, i.e., for firm n
bn ¼ fðpns,qnsÞgss 1, pns 2 ½0,pR with pnsþ1Zpns, qnsþ1Zqns with qnsrKn,
where so1 is the maximum number of admissible steps in a firm’s bid function. Consistent with actual rules in elect
markets, we will assume that the number of admissible steps does not constrain firms from bidding each unit at its
8 There is also an extensive empirical literature which confirms that contracts affect the performance of spot markets. See Bushnell et al.
Fabra and Toro (2005), Hortacsu and Puller (2008), Ku¨hn and Machado (2006), Mansur (2007), Wolak (2000) or Wolak (2007).
9 Green (1999), Newbery (1998) and, more recently, Holmberg (2011) obtain mixed results in models in which firms compete by ch
continuous supply functions. Various papers analyze the dynamic effects of contracts (Ferreira, 2003; Green and Le Coq, 2010; Liski and Montero,and tend to conclude that they have anti-competitive effects.
10 To be sure, the reasons why we recover the underpricing equilibria are similar to the ones that explain why the competitive outcome is not
sustainable under Bertrand competition with capacity constraints, even though it constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome under pure Bertrand
competition. Within the electricity auctions literature, simplified versions of our model also lead to a similar prediction (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993;
Garcı´a-Dı´az and Marı´n, 2003; Fabra et al., 2006; Crawford et al., 2007).
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marginal cost, i.e., s is large enough so as to allow firms to at least replicate their marginal cost curves.11 At each step s in
firm n’s bid function, pns specifies the minimum price at which the firm is willing to produce up to quantity qns. For a given
bid profile b¼ fbngNn 1, we construct the aggregate supply function, denoted SðqÞ, which determines the lowest price at
which all firms in the market are willing to produce up to quantity q.
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cannotThe market price, pn, at which all transactions take place, is defined as follows:
pn ¼max
q
fp¼ SðqÞ9SðqÞrPðqÞg:
In words, the market price pn is the point on the aggregate supply function, SðqÞ, at which the market clears. If the de
function PðqÞ is downward sloping, it need not always intersect the (possibly) discontinuous aggregate supply functi
which case pn is the highest price on the aggregate supply function at which there is excess demand. In contrast, if de
is inelastic, there are potentially many market clearing prices when the demand function intersects the supply funct
the right end of an step. In this case, pn is the lowest price at which the market clears, given that it must be on the
continuous) aggregate supply function.12
Firms are called to produce in increasing price order up to pn. We use qnn to denote the quantity allocated to firm
there is excess supply at pn, we assume efficient rationing on the margin, i.e., if several units have been bid at pn, they
residual demand proportionally to the quantities offered at exactly pn, unless their marginal costs differ, in which cas
low cost units are dispatched first.13 By using efficient rationing, the set of equilibria of our game approximates the
equilibria of a game in which rationing pro rata on the margin is used but where firms choose their bid prices on a
grid, which is what occurs in real markets. Note that if rationing pro rata on the margin were assumed in our set
would lead to a problem of non existence of equilibrium similar to the one that arises under a Bertrand game
asymmetric costs.
We label prices and quantities as either competitive or non competitive. The competitive price, denoted pc , is the
on the aggregate marginal cost function at which demand and competitive supply intersect. As before, if they d
intersect, we assume that pc is the highest price at which there is excess demand. The resulting competitive quantitie
denoted ðqc1, . . . ,qcNÞ. All other prices and quantities are referred to as non competitive. Similar labels are used to cl
market outcomes.
An important feature of the model is that firms might be subject to forward contracts. We use tn to denote fir
contract price, and xnZ0 to denote firm n’s contract quantity; both tn and xn are fixed when firms submit their
Consequently, when the market price is pn and firm n’s dispatched quantity is qnn, firm n’s profits are given by
pnðpn,qnnÞ ¼ pnqnn CnðqnnÞþ½tn pnxn,
where the first two terms give the firm’s market profits, and the last term gives the firm’s contract profits. To fix idea
can think of these contracts as being purely financial, i.e., firm n continues to supply all its quantity qnn to the market
and the contract’s counterpart, e.g. a big customer, continues to buy all its demand from the market at pn. The con
requires firm n to pay (receive) the difference between the contract price and the market price times the contract qua
½tn pnxn, whenever positive (negative). Re writing the above expression as
pnðpn,qnnÞ ¼ pn½qnn xn CnðqnnÞþtnxn
shows that firms’ bidding incentives depend on their net positions, ½qnn xn, which are positive for the net sellers, qnn
and negative for the net buyers, qnnoxn. The last term, tnxn, is fixed when firms compete in the spot market; as such,
no effect on bidding incentives (indeed, one could set tn ¼ 0 without loss of generality). We will assume that total con
volume never exceeds demand at the competitive price,
P
nxnrDðpcÞ, thus ruling out the cases in which xnZqcn hol
all firms n (with at least one strict inequality).
Firm n’s problem is to choose a finite number of price quantity pairs that maximize pn given its rivals’ s
functions. We focus on Nash equilibria in pure strategies. All aspects of the model are common knowledge among fir
Before we proceed, it is convenient to set some terminology and notation. We first define which firms are marg
11 The limit on the number of bids is typically set for each production unit rather than at the firm level. For instance, in the original market de
England and Wales, firms were allowed to submit up to three incremental prices per unit; up to 25 price–quantity pairs per unit in Spain; and u
per unit in Texas. In practice, firms use even fewer bidpoints than the ones they are allowed to (Hortacsu and Puller, 2008).
12 These assumptions are consistent with most auction rules in practice. For instance, in the Spanish electricity market, demand bidsdetermine the market price (see www.omel.es). There are exceptions to this rule, particularly in US markets, which now clear prices with demand when
all supply offers are exhausted (this is referred to as scarcity pricing). However, this possibility does not arise in our model given that there is always
enough aggregate capacity to cover total demand. Last, the fact that the auctioneer chooses the lowest market-clearing price whenever there are multiple
market-clearing prices is reasonable to the extent that it is the most favorable one from consumers’ point of view. This is also assumed in Kremer and
Nyborg (2004) and Kastl (2011).
13 Several papers in the electricity auctions literature assume efficient rationing on-the-margin as well (see, for instance, Garcı´a-Dı´az and Marı´n,
2003; Fabra et al., 2006, among others).
14 When applied to electricity markets, it could be argued that firms face demand uncertainty (or demand variation) at the bidding stage. However,
this issue depends on the duration of bids as compared to the frequency of market clearing: for instance, when firms submit supply functions that remain
valid for a single period of market clearing, there will be little or no relevant variation in demand; however, with bids that remain good for a whole day,
demand will vary considerably over the pricing period. Accordingly, our paper applies to the first case, which is the one in place in most electricity
markets in practice. Last, the contracting stage may be affected by demand variation, as contracts typically remain fixed for longer periods of time.
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Definition 1. For an arbitrary bid function profile resulting in an outcome fpn; ðqn1, . . . ,qnNÞg, firm n is marginal if its bid
function has some step s at the market price, pns ¼ pn.
We use the above definition to also classify firms as either price setters or non price setters:
it is a
rice
le, b.
e fixDefinition 2. For an arbitrary bid function profile resulting in an outcome fpn; ðqn1, . . . ,qnNÞg, firm n is a price setter if
marginal firm and if it is at least partly dispatching its marginal step, qnn 2 ðqns1,qns. Otherwise, firm n is a non p
setter.
Finally, both the market price and the dispatched quantities depend on the demand, DðpÞ, and the bid function profi
However, in order to simplify notation, we suppress these arguments whenever clear from the context.
3. Illustrative example
We start by analyzing a simple example to convey the intuitions of the main results of the paper. In particular, w
N¼ 2 and assume that demand is perfectly inelastic at D¼3. There exist four types of units, each with capacity normalized
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s faceto one, whose marginal costs are 0, 1, 2 or 2.5. Firm 1 owns four units, one of each cost type, while firm 2 onl
three units, not owning the unit with marginal costs 2. More specifically, their marginal cost function
c1 ¼ fð0;1Þ,ð1;2Þ,ð2;3Þ,ð2:5,4Þg and c2 ¼ fð0;1Þ,ð1;2Þ,ð2:5,3Þg. Accordingly, firms 1 and 2 will be respectively referred
the ‘‘large firm’’ and the ‘‘small firm’’. Finally, we assume without loss of generality that the contract price is zero, t
Figs. 1 and 2 depict firms’ marginal cost functions together with the residual demand they face when the rival b
marginal costs.
We first show that in the absence of contracts, the competitive outcome cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Sup
that both firms bid at marginal costs, bn ¼ cn, n¼ 1;2, so that the aggregate supply function is S¼ fð0;2Þ,ð1;4Þ,ð2;5Þ,ð2
Since the auctioneer has to dispatch three units to satisfy demand, the competitive outcome is fpc ¼ 1; ðqc1 ¼ 1:5,qc2 ¼
with profits pcn ¼ 1, n¼1,2 (area A in the figures). If firm 1 deviates to bidding all its units at 2.5, i.e., b01 ¼ fð2:5,4Þ
aggregate supply function becomes S0 ¼ fð0;1Þ,ð1;2Þ,ð2:5,7Þg, the market price is raised to pn ¼ 2:5, and firms’ dispa
quantities are qn1 ¼ 1 and qn2 ¼ 2 (by the efficient tie breaking rule, firm 1’s first unit is dispatched at capacity, as
lower marginal costs than any of the other units that tie at the margin). Thus, firm 1 makes a larger profit, p01 ¼ 2:5
(its profits increase by area BþC in Fig. 1). Interestingly, firm 2’s profits increase even more, p02 ¼ 4. Note that on
also rule out existence of a competitive equilibrium by letting firm 2 deviate from marginal cost bidding. In this case
2 would optimally raise the price to 2, e.g. by bidding at b02 ¼ fð2;2Þ,ð2:5,3Þg, in order to increase its profits to p02 ¼ 2
(its profits increase by area B in Fig. 2); again, the other firm gains even more, p01 ¼ 3. Thus, the competitive out
cannot be sustained in equilibrium, unless firms used weakly dominated strategies, a possibility ruled out throug
the paper.
The two bid function profiles considered above, fb01,c2g and fc1,b02g, are indeed an equilibrium. Under both profile
firm is setting the market price at the level that maximizes its profits over its residual demand (which coincides wit
marginal cost of its rival’s first undispatched unit), while the other firm cannot increase its profits as it is producin
maximum it can without incurring in losses. The two equilibria are not outcome equivalent, as the first results in a
price, pn ¼ 2:5, while the second results in a lower price, pn ¼ 2. However, none of them can be ruled out by appeali
payoff dominance arguments, given that each firm is strictly better off when the rival sets the price. To see this, recal
at the first equilibrium firms’ profits are p1 ¼ 2:5 and p2 ¼ 4, whereas at the second firms’ profits are p1 ¼ 3 and p2 ¼
Besides the two equilibria described above, there are many other equilibrium bid profiles; in particular, there
several equilibria with both firms bidding some units above marginal costs. The reason for this multiplicity is that se
bid profiles yield the same outcome. However, conditionally on the identity of the firm that sets the price, all equilibr
outcome equivalent to the two equilibria just described. In sum, even though the strategy space is quite large, we ne
just focus on candidate equilibrium outcomes, of which there are at most as many as firms in the market.
To illustrate the impact of contracts, let us first allocate all contracts to the large firm, x1 2 ð1;24x2 ¼ 0. If firm 2 b
marginal costs, firm 1’s profit maximizing price now equals pn ¼ 1 rather than pn ¼ 2:5. To see this, note that if firm
the market price at pn ¼ 2:5, it now becomes a net buyer as its contracts exceed its equilibrium output, x14qn1 ¼ 1. As
it prefers to reduce the price to pn ¼ 1 by e.g. bidding at marginal costs. Indeed, since marginal cost bidding allows firm
save the price difference over its net buying position, its profits increase by ½1 2:5½1 x140 (area DþE in Fi
Therefore, the equilibrium at which firm 1 sets the price at pn ¼ 2:5 can no longer be sustained, whereas the equilibriu
which firm 2 sets the price at pn ¼ 2 can still be sustained (firm 2’s incentives are unchanged as it has no contracts,
firm 1 does not find it profitable to reduce the price as at this equilibrium it is a net seller, x1rqn1 ¼ 2). Since onl
low price equilibrium outcome survives, allocating contracts to the large firm is pro competitive.
(footnote continued)
However, this has no effect on the bidding stage as long as the features described above are met (see Fabra et al., 2011, for a model in which firm
demand uncertainty at the capacity-investment stage).
15 This also implies that both equilibria are coalition-proof (see Bernheim et al., 1987).5
Alternatively, let us now allocate all contracts to the small firm, x2 2 ð1;24x1 ¼ 0. By the same logic, the equilibrium
with firm 2 setting the price at pn ¼ 2 disappears: as a net buyer, firm 2 would rather bid at marginal costs in order to
reduce the price from pn ¼ 2 to pn ¼ 1 and thus save the price difference over its net position, ½1 2½1 x240 (area E in
Fig. 2). However, firm 1 would then respond by setting the price at pn ¼ 2:5, which implies that the only surviving
ble 1
Fig. 1. Firm 1’s marginal costs and residual demand in the example.
Fig. 2. Firm 2’s marginal costs and residual demand in the example.
Table 1
Equilibrium prices as a function of firms’ forward contract positions.
Cases Equilibrium prices
No contracts xi 2 ð1;24xj 0
Firm i is large {2.5,2} f+,2g
Firm i is small {2,2.5} f+,2:5g
The first (second) term in brackets is the price that firm i (firm j) would set in
equilibrium when its rival behaves as a price-taker; there is an+ if such an
equilibrium does not exist.equilibrium outcome is the one with the high price. Hence, forward contracts are anti competitive in this case. Ta
summarizes these results.6
4. Analysis of the model
In this section, we characterize equilibrium bidding behavior and equilibrium outcomes in the general model. Rather
than deriving equilibrium strategies, we instead deduce structural features that any equilibrium must have. As it is
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costscommon in the analysis of uniform price auctions, we first refine the equilibrium set by restricting attention to strat
that are not weakly dominated.
Lemma 1. For firm n, it is weakly dominated (i) to bid below marginal costs for quantities above its contract cover, qn4
well as (ii) to bid above marginal costs for quantities not exceeding its contract cover, qnoxn.
In words, weak dominance arguments eliminate below marginal cost bidding only for quantities above the
contract cover, qn4xn, i.e., such that the firm is a net seller.
16 At lower quantities, the firm is a net buyer, and as su
would like to exercise monopsony power by bidding some units below marginal cost. Consistent with this, w
dominance arguments also eliminate above marginal cost bidding for quantities below the firm’s contract cover, qno
In what follows, we will first fix the identity of the price setter in order to characterize the non price setters’ op
bidding behavior.
Lemma 2 (Garcı´a Dı´az and Marı´n, 2003). At any Nash Equilibrium in which firm i is a price setter, all other firms j, ja
fully dispatching all their units with marginal costs strictly below the equilibrium price pn.
The intuition underlying Lemma 2 is simple. Given that firm i is dispatching some output at pn, it cannot be the
that some other firm j, jai, has some unit with marginal costs strictly below pn that has not been called to produce
instead bid such an undispatched unit slightly below pn, firm j would earn a positive profit margin over its incr
production, with only (if any) a slight reduction in the price. Key to this result is the fact that firms submit a finite nu
of price quantity pairs, which implies that there is a positive output mass at the margin. Hence, when firm j reduc
bid, the quantity gain always outweighs the price reduction as the latter can be made arbitrarily small.
Lemma 3. At any Nash Equilibrium in which firm i is a price setter, firm j, jai, is not dispatching any unit with marginal
strictly above the equilibrium price pn if either one of the following two conditions holds18:
(1) firm j is a net seller or has a balanced position, i.e., qnj Zxj, or
(2) there is at least one marginal firm that is not fully dispatching its marginal step, i.e., pn ¼ pks and qnkoqks, kaj.marginal costs.
rium given thatBy the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, net sellers cannot sell their marginal output below
Similarly, firms with a balanced position do not find it profitable to bid below marginal costs in equilibium price timesby bidding at marginal costs they could save the difference between their marginal costs and the equilibr
their reduced output. Hence, qnj Zxj is sufficient to guarantee that firm j does not dispatch any unit with marginal costs
k has
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sistentbelow pn.
The same result does not apply in general to an equilibrium in which firm j is a net buyer, unless some other firm
bid some step at pn which has not been fully dispatched (i.e., pn ¼ pks and qnkoqks). When this is the case, firm j can
producing at a loss by bidding some of its output slightly above pn, with no effect on the price. However, if all the mar
firms are fully dispatching their marginal steps, firm j may be unable to reduce its production so as to avoid produ
losses unless it raises the price high enough. As firm j is a net buyer, the price increase which may no long
infinitesimal may reduce the firm’s profits (firm j reduces productive losses but buys its negative net position at a h
price). There is hence no guarantee that at any equilibrium in which firm i is a price setter, the other firms produce
efficient manner unless they are all net sellers.
The next proposition combines the two lemmas above to provide conditions under which at any equilibrium the
price setters behave as if they were price takers.
Proposition 1. At any Nash Equilibrium in which firm i is a price setter, firm j, jai, produces the same ‘‘as if’’ it were bidd
marginal costs if either one of the two conditions in the statement of Lemma 3 holds.
16 Kastl (2011) shows that in discrete multi-unit uniform-price auctions, a rational bidder (without contracts) may submit a bid above its m
valuation (in the current paper, a bid below marginal costs). This occurs only when the number of admissible steps in the bid functions is lower th
number of units, as it implies that bidders have to bundle bids for several units together. However, this does not arise in our paper given that, con
with practice, bidders can at least submit as many bids as units they own.
17 We cannot rule out either below or above marginal cost bidding for qn xn because bid functions are step functions. With continuous bid
functions instead, bidding qn xn at marginal costs would be a dominant strategy.
18 In the absence of contracts, conditions (1) and (2) in the Lemma are not needed, since all firms would trivially be net-sellers. Indeed, without these
two conditions, Lemma 3 is contained in Garcı´a-Dı´az and Marı´n’s (2003) Corollary 1.
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The conditions under which Proposition 1 holds relate to equilibrium features, which are endogenous, such as the
identity of the price setter or the non price setters’ equilibrium net positions. Nevertheless, one can guarantee that at any
equilibrium Proposition 1 always holds if all firms are net sellers at the competitive outcome. This condition relates to the
primitives of the game, which are no longer endogenous.
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moreTo see why this is the case, note that weak dominance arguments imply that if xnoqcn holds for all firms, they mu
bid their competitive quantities at or above marginal costs. Therefore, the equilibrium price pn cannot be lower th
This implies that those firms that bid at marginal costs must be producing more than at the competitive outcome, an
thus net sellers; while those firms that bid above marginal costs must also be net sellers as a firm only bids a
marginal costs for quantities above its contract cover (Lemma 1 (i)). Therefore, since condition (1) of Lemma 3 is sati
Proposition 1 applies.
In contrast, Proposition 1 does not generally hold if some firms are net buyers at the competitive outcome. First,
pnrpc cannot be ruled out, even the firms that are bidding at marginal costs may produce below their compe
quantities, and hence remain/become net buyers. Moreover, even if pn4pc , and some firms expand production above
competitive quantities, such an increase in quantity might not be enough so as to exceed their contract positions.
For these reasons, it will be useful to analyze these two cases separately, which we respectively refer to as the re
cases (in which xnoqcn for all firms) and the irregular cases (in which xnoqcn holds for some but not all firms). The re
cases are the empirically most relevant ones given that, in practice, regulators never force firms to holding contracts a
their competitive quantities.19
We start the analysis of the regular cases by identifying conditions under which the competitive outcome const
the unique equilibrium outcome of the game.
Proposition 2. Let xnoqcn hold for all firms.
(i) If every possible combination of ðN 1Þ firms can jointly serve total demand at the competitive price, then the u
equilibrium outcome is the competitive one, i.e., pn ¼ pc and qnn ¼ qcn for all n.
(ii) Whenever there is supply rationing at pc, any Nash equilibrium results in the competitive outcome if and only if there is
than one price setter.idualIf every possible combination of ðN 1Þ firms can jointly serve total demand at the competitive price, the res
ce, all
n 2 isdemand faced by the Nth firm would fall down to zero if it deviated optimally from the competitive equilibrium. Hen
firms have no option but to behave competitively. Note, however, that while the condition in part (i) of Propositio
sufficient for the competitive outcome to emerge, it is nevertheless not necessary. If this condition did not hold, the Nth
aking
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firms’firm would have the possibility of manipulating the price up a notch. But if such a firm is not marginal, then it is m
strictly positive profits out of all its dispatched units, so that it might not find profitable to deviate as the losses
reducing output might exceed the gains due to the price increase.
But for knife edge cases with no supply rationing at pc,20 the coexistence of multiple price setters is both necessar
sufficient for the competitive outcome to be sustainable. If there was only one price setter, its bid would determin
market price, and the firm would have incentives to engage in supply reduction. The upshot of this is that with mu
price setters, the equilibrium must be competitive as any of them would otherwise gain by slightly undercutting the
in order to achieve a positive increase in output. It follows that there cannot occur (payoff relevant) ties at the m
among dispatched units, unless the equilibrium is competitive. In contrast, ties at the equilibrium price with only one
dispatching output at the margin will be (almost always) the rule. This will be clearly the case with inelastic deman
the price setter will optimally drive the price up to the next step in its rivals’ bid functions.21
An important consequence of Proposition 2 is that at any non competitive Nash equilibrium, there is a unique price s
This fact allows us to proceed by fixing the identity of the price setter and treating all other firms as non price set
4.1. The non price setters’ and the price setter’s optimal behavior
In order to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium bidding, we will first characterize
optimal bidding behavior conditional on their identities.
etitive
1 for
one of19 The analysis of the irregular cases can be found at the Journal’s Web Site as supplementary material.
20 Without supply rationing at pc, there could exist equilibria with pn4pc and ties at the margin, as long as firms still produce their comp
quantities. One simple example in which this is the case has D 2, c1 c2 fð0;1Þg and c3 fðc,1Þg. In equilibrium, pn c40 pc while qnn qcn
n 1;2, and qn3 q
c
3 0. Both firms 1 and 2 could be price-setters if they bid at b1 b2 fðc,1Þg, but the same outcome would also arise with justthem bidding at c while the other bids below. In this sense, if there is no supply rationing at pc , ties at the margin among dispatched units can occur in
equilibrium, but such ties are payoff irrelevant.
21 With a rationing pro-rata on-the-margin rule, such a tie at the margin would not arise. Nevertheless, the outcome would (almost perfectly)
approximate the equilibrium outcome under the efficient tie-breaking rule. Note that if the tie-breaking rule did not allocate the marginal output to the
low cost firm first, such a firm would avoid the tie by bidding slightly below its rivals’ first non-accepted bid.
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By Proposition 1, we already know that the non price setters behave as price takers, i.e., they have to decide how much
to produce at a given market price, pn. Formally,
qNPSj ðpnÞ 2 arg max
qn
j
pNPSj ðpn; qnj Þ,
alent
mand
rice
tter’s
c , the
need
arket
etters
ð3Þ
s the
ð4Þ
e first
rice
, and
en its
firms
n, we
rmer
in pn,
etters
ways
r are
d the
tion.
rice
. Thewhere
pNPSj ðpn; qnj Þ ¼ pn½qnj xj Cjðqnj Þþtjxj:
In order to produce qNPSj ðpnÞ, the non price setters can bid at marginal costs or use any other outcome equiv
strategy. However, their choice of bidding strategies is not irrelevant, as these determine the shape of the residual de
faced by the price setter and hence its optimal bidding behavior. For this reason, we will not assume that the non p
setters bid at marginal costs, unless we make it explicit. It follows that we can readily compute the price se
production in equilibrium, but not outside the equilibrium. In particular, at any candidate equilibrium with pn ¼ p
price setter produces qci , while if p
n4pc , given that the market must clear, the price setter produces
qPSi ðpnÞ ¼DðpnÞ
X
jai
qNPSj ðpnÞ:
The above equation might not be satisfied at prices other than the equilibrium price, given that the non price setters
not be bidding at marginal costs outside the equilibrium, and given that the market need not always clear.
Instead of choosing how much to produce at a given price, the price setter behaves as if it were to choose the m
price that maximizes its profits over its residual demand, i.e., total demand minus the quantity that the non price s
are willing to supply at each price. Formally,
pPSi ðbiÞ 2 arg max
pn
pPSi ðpn; biÞ,
where
pPSi ðpn; biÞ ¼ p½qni ðpn; biÞ xi Cðqni ðpn; biÞÞþtixi
and
qni ðpn; biÞ ¼max 0,DðpnÞ
X
jai
qnj ðpn; bjÞ
8<
:
9=
;:
In order to understand the price setter’s bidding incentives, consider the change in firm i’s profits when it raise
market price from pn to some p04pn,
pPSi ðp0; biÞ pPSi ðpn; biÞ ¼ ½p0 pn½qni ðp0; biÞ xi
Z qn
i
ðpn ;b iÞ
qn
i
ðp0 ;b iÞ
½pn ciðzÞ dz:
As in any standard monopoly problem, a price increase implies greater revenues through the firm’s net position th
term in (4) but it also implies a profit loss due to the output reduction the second term in (4). Accordingly, the p
setter’s incentives to raise the price are stronger the bigger its net position is, the less elastic its residual demand is
the smaller the price cost margin on its lost production is. It then follows that firm i’s profit maximizing price giv
rivals’ strategies, pPSi ðbiÞ, is non increasing in its contract cover, xi. This mimics the standard result that smaller
(here, firms with smaller net positions) have weaker incentives to raise prices.
We conclude this subsection by comparing the price setter’s and non price setters’ profits. To simplify notatio
write pPSi ðpnÞ and pNPSj ðpnÞ, for jai, to respectively denote the price setter’s and non price setters’ profits when the fo
sets the market price at pn and all the latter produces qNPSj ðpnÞ.
Lemma 4. Let xnoqcn hold for all firms. For any market price pn, (i) the non price setters’ profits pNPSj ðpnÞ are increasing
and (ii) they weakly exceed those they would get as a price setter at the same market price, pPSi ðpnÞrpNPSi ðpnÞ.
Since under the regular cases all firms are net sellers in equilibrium, any price increase makes the non price s
strictly better off. We will thus assume that whenever the price setter is indifferent between multiple prices, it al
chooses the highest one, as it is the payoff dominant one. Finally, the profits that a firm earns as a non price sette
bounded below by the profits it could obtain as a price setter: both the non price setters and the price setter are pai
same price, but the price setter sells (weakly) less and thus gives up a positive profit margin on its reduced produc
4.2. Equilibrium characterization
An equilibrium outcome is a collection of quantities produced by the non price setters and a price chosen by the p
setter such that no firm wants to deviate, either by changing its quantity or price choice, or by changing its identity
following theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium bidding in the regular cases.9
Theorem 1. Let xnoqcn hold for all firms. A strategy profile b constitutes a Nash equilibrium in which firm i is the price setter if
and only if the following three conditions hold
(1) pn ¼ pPSi ðbiÞZpc and qnj ¼ qNPSj ðpnÞ for all jai. P
(2) pPSi ðpnÞZpNPSi ðpÞ for all popn such that qNPSi ðpÞþ jaiqjðp; bÞ ¼DðpÞ.
(3) pNPSj ðpnÞZpPSj ðpPSj Þ for all jai such that pPSj ðbjÞ4pn.zes its profits over the residual demand, pn ¼ pPSi ðbiÞ. By
e competitive price. All the other firms must behave asIn equilibrium, the price setter chooses the price that maximi
weak dominance arguments, it must be either equal or above thre bidding at marginal costs (Proposition 1).price takers given pn, and hence produce the same as if they we
timizing conditionally on their identities. Thus, the onlyBy condition (1) of Theorem 1 above, all firms are already opnon
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tcomesrelevant deviations are those by which firms reverse their identities. Since the price setter might consider becoming a
price setter in order to sell more at a lower market price, condition (2) is needed to rule out such deviations. In turn,
all the non price setters are net sellers in equilibrium, those with profit maximizing prices no larger than pn never fi
optimal to deviate: not only they would sell their production at a (weakly) lower price, but also they would also sel
Hence, the only relevant deviations are those by the remaining non price setters, but condition (3) rules them out.
4.3. Equilibrium existence and multiplicity
For a given price setter, there exist multiple bid function profiles that constitute an equilibrium (all those satis
Theorem 1). This derives from the fact that firms only care about one point in their bid functions, the one correspond
the market price. Furthermore, the multiplicity of equilibrium bid functions may pave the way for multiplic
equilibrium outcomes to emerge. Fortunately, this is not the case, as stated next.22
Proposition 3. (i) There exists an equilibrium in which firm i is the price setter if and only if the equilibrium in which firm
the price at pn ¼ pPSi ðciÞ while all the other firms bid at marginal costs exists. (ii) Furthermore, if there also exist other equ
in which firm i is the price setter, the one above is the payoff dominant one.
Proposition 3 implies that, conditionally on the identity of the price setter, there is no loss of generality (as
equilibrium outcomes are concerned) in restricting attention to equilibria in which the non price setters bid at mar
costs and the price setter maximizes its profits over the resulting residual demand. This claim is supported by two fa
such an equilibrium does not exist, there does not exist any other equilibrium in which the same firm acts as the p
setter; while if it exists, it is either the unique equilibrium or the payoff dominant one.
The next result, which is a corollary of Theorem 1, guarantees equilibrium existence. In particular, the cand
equilibrium with the highest price always exists.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium with pn ¼maxipPSi ðciÞ always exists.
We have shown that, conditionally on the identity of the price setter, equilibrium multiplicity is outcome irrele
However, the multiplicity of equilibria that differ in the identity of the price setter might potentially result in diff
equilibrium prices. This multiplicity was highlighted in the illustrative example provided in Section 3 but it holds
generally. Furthermore, existence of a candidate equilibrium implies that all other candidate equilibria with h
equilibrium prices also exist. To understand this, note that the profits that a firm achieves as a price setter are given
the profits it makes as a non price setter are increasing in the equilibrium price (Lemma 4). Hence, if none of the firm
incentives to deviate from a candidate equilibrium, it must also be the case that none of them wants to deviate fr
candidate equilibrium with a higher price. For similar reasons, if a candidate equilibrium does not exist, there doe
exist any other candidate equilibrium with a lower price. These results are stated in the last corollary of Theorem
Corollary 2. If the equilibrium with pn ¼ pPSi ðciÞ exists, the equilibria with pn ¼ pPSn ðcnÞZpPSi ðciÞ also exist. Alternativel
does not exist, the equilibria with pn ¼ pPSn ðcnÞrpPSi ðciÞ do not exist either, n¼ 1, . . . ,N.
Combining the two corollaries above, it follows that under the same primitives of the game, a competitive equilib
cannot coexist with a non competitive equilibrium.
4.4. The impact of forward contracts
We are now ready to analyze the impact of forward contract commitments on equilibrium outcomes. Since our a
to perform comparative statics with respect to changes in contracts, in what follows, with some abuse of notation, w
write pPSi ðxiÞ to denote the profit maximizing price of firm i when its rivals bid at marginal costs and its contract oblig
22 In contrast, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes is pervasive in auctions with continuous bid functions (see Wilson, 1979; Klemperer and
1989; Back and Zender, 1993, among others). Note that having net-sellers is crucial for the result, as in the irregular cases multiple equilibrium ou
might arise (see the analysis in the supplementary material).10
is xi. We will also index firms according to their profit maximizing prices at the no contracts case, i.e., p
PS
1 ð0ÞZ
pPS2 ð0ÞZ   ZpPSN ð0Þ.
Suppose first that firms are symmetric in all respects. The next lemma characterizes the impact on prices and
productive efficiency of increasing total contracts when they are either symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed
ing in
d theamong firms.
Lemma 5. In a symmetric oligopoly,
(i) If forward contracts are equally distributed among firms, i.e., x1 ¼    ¼ xN ¼ xoqc , equilibrium prices are non increas
x and productive efficiency is non decreasing in x.
(ii) If forward contracts are not equally distributed among firms, the highest equilibrium price is (weakly) higher an
associated productive efficiency is (weakly) lower than under the equal contract distribution.igher(iii) The highest equilibrium price with contracts is (weakly) lower and the associated productive efficiency is (weakly) h
than under the no contract case. The comparison is strict if contracts are allocated to all firms.ity ofSince firms are fully symmetric, there exist N price equivalent equilibrium outcomes that only differ in the ident
cy is
ect ofthe price setter. As firms’ contract cover is increased, the equilibrium price is reduced and productive efficien
improved.23 Furthermore, any departure from the symmetric contract distribution would weaken the positive eff
contracts as firms’ ex ante symmetry, which induces more competitive outcomes, would no longer be preserved.24
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rices.However, the highest equilibrium price is (weakly) lower with contracts than without, regardless of how contrac
distributed. If contracts are allocated to all firms but at least one, the equilibrium price without contracts remains to b
highest equilibrium price. However, if contracts are allocated to all firms, all their profit maximizing prices go down
so does the highest equilibrium price.
We next allow for all types of asymmetries among firms, and perform comparative statics with respect to con
volume up to firms’ competitive quantities, depending on the distribution of contracts across firms.
Proposition 4. Consider an asymmetric oligopoly, such that at the no contracts case equilibrium prices are fpPS1 ð0Þ, . . . ,p
for 1r irN, while prices pPSn ð0Þ for ionrN cannot be sustained because firm 1 would deviate from the candidate equili
at which firm n is price setter.
(i) If forward contracts are awarded to firm 1 only, prices are (weakly) lower than at the no contracts case. Furtherm
(weak) non monotonic relationship between contract volume and equilibrium prices may arise.
(ii) If forward contracts are awarded to firm i only, there exists x0i 2 ð0,qci Þ, such that any contract allocation xiox0i lea
(weakly) lower prices than at the no contracts case, whereas any contract allocation xiZx0 leads to (weakly) higher pi
Hence, there is a (weak) non monotonic relationship between contract volume and equilibrium prices.
(iii) If forward contracts are awarded to firms n4 i only, they have no effect on equilibrium outcomes.n4 i
owerAt the no contracts case, firm 1 and firm i set the highest and lowest equilibrium prices respectively, while firms
behave as price takers at any equilibrium. Accordingly, we say that firm 1 and firm i have ‘high’ and ‘low’ market pricesrespectively, while firms n4 i have ‘no’ market power at all. The impact of forward contracts on equilibrium p
depends on how contracts are awarded among these firms.
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SupplyTo understand the results in Proposition 4 above, it is important to first recall that as a firm’s contracts go up, its p
maximizing price (weakly) goes down. In turn, given that a low price makes it relatively more attractive f
uncontracted non price setter to become the price setter, the equilibrium in which the contracted firm sets the
might disappear. By the opposite logic, the contracted firm now finds it more appealing to be the non price setter, so t
no other firm has incentives to deviate, there can now appear new equilibria involving lower prices. These effect
illustrated in Figs. 3 5.
If all contracts are awarded to the firm with ‘high’ market power, as in part (i), contracts (weakly) reduce prices
respect to the no contracts case. This holds true regardless of whether the equilibrium in which the contracted firm
the price disappears (Fig. 3), and regardless of whether new equilibria arise (Fig. 5), given that in any case the rema
equilibria result in lower prices.
The above conclusion may be reversed when all contracts are awarded to the firm with ‘low’ market power, as in pa
In this case, it is still true that contracts (weakly) reduce prices when the firm with ‘low’ market power sets the
However, prices might go up when such equilibrium disappears (for xiZx0i). Given that the equilibrium price will then b
23 In contrast, if total contract volume was further increased (taking us away from the regular cases), firms would start exercising monopsony
leading to prices below the competitive price. Furthermore, since the price-setter would produce more than at the competitive outcome, prod
inefficiencies might emerge.
24 For given contracts, similar results also arise in Allaz and Vila’ (1993) and Bushnell’ (2007) Cournot models, as well as in Newbery (1998)Function Equilibrium model.
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by firms with higher profit maximizing prices, contracts in this case may result in (weakly) higher prices as compared to the
no contracts case (Fig. 4). To the extent that higher spot market prices translate into higher forward contract prices, this effect
would make both spot market customers as well as forward contract holders worse off.
Last, if contracts are awarded to firms with ‘no market power’, as in part (iii), contracts simply have no effect as such
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Fig. 3. Forward contracts by firm 1 and equilibrium prices (asymmetric firms (55%, 45%)).
Fig. 4. Forward contracts by firm 2 and equilibrium prices (asymmetric firms (55%, 45%)). Note: In Figs. 2 and 3 we have assumed N 2. There are 200
units, two at each marginal cost level, k 1, . . . ,100, each owned by a different firm. Firm 1’s units have capacity 1.10 while firm 2’s units have capacity
0.9. Demand is price-inelastic, D 70, so that pc 35 and qc1 38:54q
c
2 31:5.
Fig. 5. Forward contracts by firm 1 and equilibrium prices (asymmetric firms (60%, 40%)). Note: In Fig. 4 we have assumed N 2. There are 200 units, two
at each marginal cost level, k 1, . . . ,100, each owned by a different firm. Firm 1’s units have capacity 1.20 while firm 2’s units have capacity 0.8. Demand
is price-inelastic, D 70, so that pc 35 and qc1 424q
c
2 28.firms behave as price takers with or without contracts.
In order to highlight the distinct impact of contracts depending on how these are distributed, Proposition
considered the case in which all contracts are allocated to a single firm. Allocating contracts to different firms at the
time would reinforce the pro competitive effects identified above. For instance, allocating a given amount of contra
firm 2 is more effective when firm 1 also holds contracts. This is because the critical value x02 goes up, thus enlarging th
of parameter values for which low and high price equilibria coexist and reducing the incidence of anti competitive ef
The effect of forward contracts on prices depends on several factors, including firms’ cost functions, firms’ sizes
in general, the degree of firms’ asymmetries. Large asymmetries, such that only one firm has market power a12
no contracts case, lead to a clear cut policy conclusion: the dominant firm should be forced to hold contracts; getting
contract volume wrong in this case is not very costly, as contracts would in any case be effective. In contrast, mild
asymmetries among firms (particularly so, between the firms with ‘high’ and ‘low’ market power) might give rise to the
anti competitive effects identified in Proposition 4.
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anishTo illustrate this point, consider the following particular case of the general model. There are two firms with capa
K1 ¼ aK4K2 ¼ ð1 aÞK , where a provides a measure of firms’ capacity asymmetries. All production units have
marginal costs normalized to zero; competitive quantities are thus qc1 ¼ aDð0Þ and qc2 ¼ ð1 aÞDð0Þ. Demand DðpÞ is ass
to be downward sloping, and firms’ profits are assumed concave. To make the problem interesting, assume that aggr
capacity is enough to satisfy all demand at marginal costs, i.e., Dð0ÞoK , and that if firms’ capacities were symmetric,
of them would have enough capacity to satisfy all demand alone, i.e., K=2oDð0ÞoK .
Under this specification, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 6. Suppose contracts x2 2 ð0,qc2Þ are allocated to firm 2. There exists baðx2Þ such that equilibrium price
fpPS1 ð0Þ,pPS2 ðx2Þg if aobaðx2Þ and fpPS1 ð0Þg if a 2 ½baðx2Þ,1. The critical value baðx2Þ is decreasing in x2; in particular, baðx2Þo
while the price difference pPS1 ð0Þ pPS2 ðx2Þ40 is increasing in a and x2.
Lemma 6 above implies that allocating contracts to firm 2 is inconsequential in markets with large asymmetries, i.
a4bað0Þ, as firm 2 is a non price setter with or without contracts. In markets with small asymmetries, i.e., for ao
allocating contracts x2 to firm 2 is pro competitive, as one of the two possible equilibrium prices goes down. In con
when asymmetries between firms 1 and 2 are neither too large nor too small, i.e., for a 2 ðbaðx2Þ,bað0ÞÞ, allocating con
x2 is anti competitive as the low price equilibrium disappears. Furthermore, it is precisely when contracts rule out th
price equilibrium when the difference between the high price, pPS1 ð0Þ, and the low price, pPS2 ðx2Þ, is wider.
As a conclusion, the regulator should be most cautious when deciding on contract volume and its distribution a
firms in markets in which firms’ asymmetries are neither too large nor too small. However, it is also in these cases
contracts can potentially play a more crucial role, as encouraging firms with ‘medium’ and ‘low’ market power to pur
such contracts may counterbalance the market power of the dominant firms.
5. Simulating the impact of forward contracts
We next apply the theoretical model to simulate equilibrium bidding behavior and market outcomes in the Sp
electricity market during 2005. The aim is to illustrate with real data the strategic effects of contracts that we have
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hetherdescribed in Section 4.25
We have considered alternative scenarios regarding total contract volume and its distribution across firm
particular, focusing on the equilibria in which only the two main firms (Endesa and Iberdrola) are price setters,2
have computed both the competitive as well as the equilibrium market outcomes under the no contracts case an
cases in which either Endesa (END) or Iberdrola (IB) hold contracts, ranging from 1 to 8 GWs. To have an idea of wha
range of contract cover meant for firms over their total capacity, let us note that Endesa’s and Iberdrola’s total capac
2005 was almost 11 GWs and 8.5 GWs, respectively.
Table 2 reports the markups that result from comparing the simulated equilibrium price to the price that would ar
a competitive market (as suggested in Borenstein et al., 2002). Markups are computed at four demand levels (express
percentiles), under the no contracts case and under the cases in which Endesa has contracted either 2 or 5 GWs
Iberdrola has contracted either 6 or 8 GWs (results for all other cases are qualitatively similar). By comparing the ma
across firms at the no contracts case (first two columns in Table 2), we can readily verify that Endesa’s profit maxim
price exceeds that of Iberdrola’s for all demand levels considered, except for peak load, at which both profit maxim
prices coincide.
Let us first consider the effects of contracts when awarded to the firm with the high profit maximizing price, En
First, contracts may reduce Endesa’s profit maximizing price as a price setter; this is, for instance, the case when En
contracts 2 GWs and demand is at its 75% or 50% percentile. Second, contracts may give rise to a new equilibrium in w
Iberdrola sets a lower price; this is the case when Endesa contracts either 2 or 5 GWs and demand is at its 50% perce
Last, contracts may eliminate certain equilibria at which Endesa sets the price; this is the case when Endesa con
5 GWs for all demand levels. Therefore, contracts by Endesa have (weak) pro competitive effects.
However, such a conclusion is reversed when contracts are awarded to the firm with the low profit maximizing
Iberdrola. More specifically, contracts by Iberdrola have (weak) anti competitive effects when they destroy low
equilibria. This is the case when Iberdrola contracts either 6 or 8 GWs and demand is at its 75% percentile.
25 The Journal’s Web site contains supplementary material with details on the Spanish electricity market as well as on the procedures w
followed to compute firms’ marginal costs.
26 Since the simulations are conducted on an hourly basis over a year, there are at least 8760 and at most (if both firms act as price-setters)
equilibrium market outcomes under each of the 17 cases considered, plus the 8760 competitive outcomes (these are the same regardless of wfirms hold contracts or not)—adding up to over 300,000 simulated market outcomes in total. Simulations have been produced by ENERGEIA, a simulation
software developed by the authors.
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The effects of contracts reported so far vary with the demand level. For example, whereas at very high or very low
demand levels contracts barely have any effect on equilibrium outcomes, their effect for intermediate demand levels can
go in either direction depending on contract volume and contract allocation. In real markets, since demand changes over
time while contract volumes remain fixed, the overall effect of contracts will depend on the relative occurrence of periods
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Table 2
The impact of forward contracts on markups ðpnpcÞ=pn expressed in percentage points in the Spanish electricity market during 2005.
% Price-setter No contracts END 2 GWs END 5 GWs IB 6 GWs IB 8 GWs
IB END IB END IB END IB END IB END
Peak load 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 n– 50.0 50.0 n– 50.0
75 11.2 15.0 11.2 n11.6 11.2 n– n– 15.0 n– 15.0
50 – 15.9 n5.2 n10.7 n5.2 n– – 15.9 – 15.9
25 23.4 23.6 23.4 23.6 23.4 n– 23.4 23.6 23.4 23.6
The table reports the simulated mark-ups ðpnpcÞ=pn for four demand levels (the year’s peak load, and the 75%, 50% and 25% demand percentiles). The
results are divided in columns, depending on the identity of the price-setter. A table entry is left empty if, for the associated demand level and contract
volumes, there is not an equilibrium in which such a firm behaves as price-setter. An asterisk denotes that the equilibrium has changed with respect to
the no-contracts case.
Table 3
The impact of forward contracts on total payments to producers (Million h) for the Spanish electricity market during 2005.
D Payments
Min Max
Contracts by ENDESA (GWs)
1 84 107
2 143 194
3 377 410
4 457 577
5 439 608
6 456 632
7 548 639
8 709 654
D Payments
Min Max
Contracts by IBERDROLA (GWs)
1 24 78
2 54 161
3 88 222
4 117 280
5 181 379
6 200 434
7 169 437
8 171 437
Total payments to producers under the competitive outcome are 9599 Mh; the minimum value under the no-contracts case is
11;422 Mh, while the maximum is 11;728 Mh. The table reports how these figures change when forward contracts are
introduced. Given that there might be multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, the Min and the Max columns report the
minimum and maximum change in total payments.in which contracts are either pro competitive or anti competitive. For illustrative purposes, we have assessed the
that contracts would have had on the Spanish electricity prices during 2005 by computing total payments to prod
over the year.
Table 3 reports the change in total payments (spot market price times each firm’s total output) when contrac
introduced. Given equilibrium multiplicity, the table reports the minimum and the maximum change in payments. U
all contract cases, total payments to generators go down, thereby indicating that the pro competitive effects of con
dominate over the anti competitive ones. However, the latter can also be inferred from these figures as they ac
for the non monotonic relationship between payments to producers and total contract volume. For instance,
non monotonicity arises when Iberdrola’s contracts are increased above 6 GWs, when savings are reduced from 200 M
either 169 Mh or 171 Mh.14
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of forward contract obligations on the performance of spot markets in a
model that tries to capture the essential institutional and structural features of electricity markets. Instead of assuming
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makeeither Cournot or Bertrand competition, we have tried to model the actual market rules that govern most elect
markets in practice. In particular, we have assumed that firms compete by submitting discrete supply func
Furthermore, we have put no restrictions on the market demand function which could be either downward slopi
price inelastic, or the firms’cost functions which could result in either constant or step wise increasing marginal
and could be symmetric or asymmetric across firms. Thus, the model is flexible enough so as to make it comparable
other more stylized models, at the same time as it allows for all degrees of complexity. Indeed, we have used it to sim
real electricity market outcomes in order to provide an order of magnitude for the model predictions.
We find that forward contracts play a key role in shaping equilibrium market outcomes. If contracts are award
dominant firms, they may destroy the equilibria at which such firms set prices. Since the surviving equilibria involve
prices, forward contracts are unambiguously pro competitive. However, the contrary occurs if contracts are award
firms with weak but yet some market power. In particular, contracts might destroy the low price equilibria, and h
have anti competitive effects. The effects of contracts on equilibrium existence also suggest that more is not always b
That is, if an increase in contract volume destroys the equilibrium at which the contracted firm sets the price,
contracts might lead to higher prices.
From a policy perspective, our analysis thus implies that forward contracts should be awarded in ways that align all
interests by (virtually) reducing their asymmetries. Paradoxical though it may seem, it is as important to mitigate the
firms’ incentives to increase prices as it is to enhance those of smaller competitors. This could be achieved by encouragin
medium to small firms in the industry to act as counterparts of the forward contract commitments imposed on the dom
producers. Similarly, restricting certain firms from entering into these contracts can be misplaced. Regarding contract vo
forcing firms to hold too few or too many forward contracts might be at best ineffective. Since the optimal contract vo
ultimately depends on firms’ cost structures and demand, it should be determined on a case by case basis.
To conclude, even though our analysis has been inspired by the workings of electricity markets, we believe th
implications have broader applicability. Since the most relevant features of our model are not unique to elect
markets, similar analyses could be applied to other contexts. Indeed, there are several other markets in which for
contracts and auctions coexist (e.g. treasury markets, gas markets, etc.), or markets which are organized in ways that
auction theory useful for understanding firms’ strategic behavior (Klemperer, 2003).
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Appendix A. Proofs
In this appendix we provide proofs of all results in the paper, except for Lemmas 1 and 5, and Corollaries 1 and 2
proofs of these results can be found at the Journal’s Web site as supplementary material.
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ers ofNotation: The following pieces of notation are used throughout the appendix. We will denote by q
n
ðpÞ the maxi
quantity that firm n can produce at marginal costs strictly below p, and by qnðpÞ the maximum quantity that firm
produce at marginal costs not exceeding p. Since the marginal cost curve, cnðqÞ, is a left continuous non decreasing
function, by treating all production units with equal marginal costs as the same unit we can write it as a finite numb
cost quantity pairs, cn ¼ fðcns,qnsÞ~sns 1g with cnsþ14cns, qnsþ14qns and qn~sn ¼ Kn. Since qnðpÞ and qnðpÞ are on the corn
firm n’s marginal cost function, the following properties trivially follow:
(i) q
n
ðpÞ and qnðpÞ are non decreasing in p.
(ii) q
n
ðpÞ ¼ qnðpÞ ¼ qns for all p 2 ðcns,cnsþ1.
(iii) q ðpÞ ¼ qns1oqnðpÞ ¼ qns for p¼ cns.n
(iv) q
n
ðp0ÞZqnðpÞ for all p04p.15
The maximum quantities that a firm can produce either below or at marginal costs are non decreasing in p, (i). If p does
not intersect the firm’s marginal cost function (or equivalently, if it falls on a vertical segment), then q
n
ðpÞ and qnðpÞ are
equal, (ii). Otherwise, q
n
ðpÞoqnðpÞ, with p reflecting the marginal costs at which the firm produces the quantities in
ðqns1,qns, (iii). Last, qnðp
0Þ exceeds qnðpÞ whenever there is a step in firm n’s marginal cost function in between p0 and p,
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Fig. 6. An example of a firm’s marginal cost function and the quantities q
n
ðpÞ and qnðpÞ.and they are both equal otherwise, (iv). These results are illustrated in Fig. 6.
Proof of Lemma 3. To show qnj rqjðpnÞ for all jai, assume for the sake of contradiction that there is some firm j for w
qnj 4qjðpnÞ holds in equilibrium. By weak dominance arguments, it must be the case that qnj rxj as it could not othe
bid below marginal costs to dispatch qnj 4qjðpnÞ. It hence follows that qnj 4xj suffices for qnj rqjðpnÞ to hold. To show
qnj ¼ xj or qnkoqks for some marginal firm k, kaj, are also sufficient conditions to ensure qnj rqjðpnÞ, let qjðpnÞoq
Consider the deviation by firm j of moving the original bid(s) for quantities in ðA,qnj  above pn (e.g. firm j could bid
quantities at marginal costs). The difference in firm j’s profits is given by
pjðb0Þ pjðbÞ ¼ ½p0 pn½q0j xjþ
Z qn
j
q0
j
½cjðzÞ pn dz:
If qksoqnk let A¼ qnj ½qks qnk. At the resulting bid function profile b
0 the market price remains pn as j’s dispatched o
under b is replaced by firm k, so that q0joqnj . Consequently, the first term in Eq. (S.1) is zero while the second is st
positive (the deviant now reduces its output and therefore its losses), so that pjðb0Þ4pjðbÞ. Since the deviation is profi
we have reached a contradiction as desired.
If qks ¼ qnk for all marginal firms k, kaj, but qnj ¼ xj let A¼ qnj qjðpnÞ. Now, firm j’s deviation implies a price inc
p04pn, thus implying that the first term in Eq. (5) may be negative. However, as we can rewrite Eq. (S.1) as the sum o
integrals, recalling that qnj ¼ xj, it follows that
pjðb0Þ pjðbÞ ¼
Z q0j
xj
½p0 pn dzþ
Z xj
q0
j
½cjðzÞ pn dz¼
Z xj
q0
j
½cjðzÞ p0 dz40,
since cjðzÞ4p0 for all z 2 ðqjðpnÞ,qnj  and hence for z 2 ½q0j,xj. The deviation is again profitable, reaching a contradiction
Proof of Proposition 1. We must show that qnj 2 ½qjðp
nÞ,qjðpnÞ for any non price setter firm j. By appealing to Lemm
follows that qnj Zqjðp
nÞ holds. Similarly, if qnj 4xj or if qnkoqks for some marginal firm k, kaj, then qnj rqjðpnÞ follows
Lemma 3. Thus qnj 2 ½qjðp
nÞ,qjðpnÞ as claimed. &
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We first show that if DðpcÞrmini
P
jaiqjðpcÞ holds, then at any Nash equilibrium pn
Assume, by contradiction, that pn4pc. Since pn must be set by at least one firm, assume that firm i is a price sette
Lemma 2,
P
jaiq
n
j Z
P
jaiqjðp
nÞ, so that qni ¼DðpnÞ
P
jaiq
n
j rDðpnÞ
P
jaiqjðp
nÞ. Furthermore, since PjaiqjðpnÞZPjaiq
then qni rDðpcÞ
P
jaiqjðpcÞr0, contradicting that firm i is a price setter. Since pn ¼ pc , it follows that qnn ¼ qcn for all
Proposition 1.
(ii) [Only if] Assume, by contradiction, that there is a unique price setter, while pn ¼ pc and qnn ¼ qcn for all n hold.
that by definition of pc , it must be the case that pcZcnðqcnÞ. For all the firms that are not marginal such a condit
satisfied with strict inequality, pc4cnðqcnÞ, so that qcn ¼ qnðpcÞ. Moreover, there must be at least one marginal firm for w16
such a condition is satisfied with equality, pc ¼ cnðqcnÞ, so that qcnoqnðpcÞ as we have ruled out the cases under which there
is no supply rationing at the competitive outcome. Two possibilities can emerge.
1. Firm i is the unique marginal firm. Hence, pc ¼ ciðqci Þ. Firm i can profitably deviate by bidding its marginal output up to
pcþE, for E small enough so that there are no other bids in ðpc ,pcþEÞ. Such a deviation is trivially profitable, pc ¼ ciðqci Þ
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thatimplies that it was making no profit out of the marginal output.
2. Both firms i and j are marginal. We cannot have pc ¼ cjðqcj Þ ¼ ciðqci Þ, as both firms would be partly dispatching
marginal steps, which contradicts the fact that there is only one price setter. Hence, let cjðqcj Þociðqci Þ. If pc ¼ cjðqcj Þo
firm i would be selling qi
c
at a price below marginal costs, which is ruled out by weak dominance. Alternative
cjðqcj Þopc ¼ ciðqci Þ, both firms must be dispatching their marginal steps as demand would not otherwise be cov
DðpcÞ ¼PjaiqjðpcÞþqci . The contradiction proves our claim.
[If] If there were more than one price setter while pn4pc , then qnnZqnðp
nÞ for all n must hold by Lemma 2.
q
n
ðpnÞZqnðpcÞZqcn, then qnnZqcn for all n. If for at least one of them qnn4qcn holds, then DðpnÞZ
P
nq
n
n4
P
nq
c
n ¼
an impossibility. Consequently, qnn ¼ qcn for all n. However, qnn ¼ qcn and pn4pc can only hold simultaneously
qnn ¼ qnðpnÞ ¼ qnðpcÞ ¼ qcn for all n, so that firms are not rationed at the competitive outcome. A possibility which has
nevertheless ruled out. &
Proof of Lemma 4. To show (i), recall that qnj Zqjðp
nÞ holds for all jai by Proposition 1. Since pnZpc , then q
j
ðpnÞZq
j
ð
q
j
in a non decreasing function of p. Consequently, pNPSj ðpnÞ is an increasing function of pn as qNPSj ðpnÞZqcj4xj.
(ii) Since pnZpc , then qNPSj ðpnÞZqcjZqPSj ðpnÞ, with strict inequality if pn4pc . Thus,
pNPSj ðpnÞ pPSj ðpnÞ ¼
Z qNPS
j
ðpnÞ
qPS
j
ðpnÞ
½pn cjðzÞ dzZ0,
as pnZcjðqNPSj ðpnÞÞ. &
Proof of Theorem 1. [Only if] Suppose that there exists a pure strategy equilibrium b in which firm i sets the pr
pn ¼ pPSi ðbiÞZpc and firms’ payoffs are pPSi ðpnÞ and pNPSj ðpnÞ, i,j¼ 1, . . .N, jai. If this is the case then Condition 1 fo
from Proposition 1 and optimal behavior by the price setter, and Conditions 2 and 3 follow trivially from the definit
Nash equilibrium.
[If] To show that no firm profits by deviating from strategies that satisfy Conditions 1 3, consider first the non p
setters j, jai. By Condition 1, they do not want to change their quantity given pn. Thus, the only relevant deviation
those that allow the firm to become the price setter at a price above pn. Deviating to a price equal to or lower than pn
profitable as by Lemma 4, pNPSj ðpÞ is increasing in p and pNPSj ðpÞZpPSj ðpÞ. Hence, those firms j with pPSj ðbjÞrpn will tri
not deviate. Those firms j with pPSj ðbjÞ4pn will not deviate as pNPSj ðpnÞZpPSj ðpPSj Þ holds by Condition 3. Last, by Condit
the price setter is already maximizing its profits over its residual demand, so that any deviation by firm i must i
becoming a non price setter at a lower price, popn, while increasing its production to qNPSi ðpÞ. Such deviation i
profitable by Condition 2. &
Proof of Proposition 3. We first prove part (ii). Let b^ and b0 be two equilibrium bid profiles such that under b^ all fi
bid at marginal costs (i.e., b^i ¼ ci) while firm i sets the price at pn ¼ p^, whereas under b0 at least one firm j, jai doe
bid at marginal costs while firm i sets the price at pn ¼ p0. Trivially, if p^ ¼ p0 both equilibria are outcome equivale
prices are the same and firms’ jai quantities must also coincide since they must satisfy Proposition 1. If p^4p0 the
non price setter prefers b^ to b0 as shown in Lemma 4. This is also the case for the price setter: if p0 ¼ pc , the price
prefers p^ to p0 by revealed preference, as it could have chosen to also bid at marginal costs to set the price at pc , but it
to set p^4pc instead; if p04pc , then
pPSi ðp^; b^iÞZpPSi ðp0; b^iÞ ¼ pPSi ðp0;b0iÞ,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that p^ is an equilibrium under b^ which requires
p^ 2 arg maxppPSi ðp; b^iÞ, and the second equality from the fact that p0 is an equilibrium under b
0 so that Proposit
holds and hence qnj ðp0; b0iÞ ¼ qnj ðp0; b^iÞ ¼ qnj ðp0; ciÞ for all jai so that qni ðp0; b0iÞ ¼ qni ðp0; b^iÞ. Since all firms are better
b^ ¼ ðb^i,ciÞ, it is the Pareto dominant one, as claimed.
If p^op0, we show next that p0 is also an equilibrium under b^. For the sake of contradiction assume it is not so that o
the three conditions in Theorem 1 must fail to hold. Since firms jai bid at marginal costs, they are trivially prod
optimally conditionally on being non price setters; furthermore, given that the non price setters do not want to be
the price setter under p^, p^op0, the same must hold true under p0 so that Condition 3 of Theorem 1 is satisfied. As p0
equilibrium under b0 then for any prp0 such that Pnqnðp; b0iÞ ¼DðpÞ,
pPSi ðp0; b0iÞ ¼ pPSi ðp0; b^iÞZpNPSi ðp; b0iÞ ¼ pNPSi ðp; b^iÞ,
where the first equality and second inequality follow from the fact that p0 is an equilibrium under b0 (so that Conditi
and 2 in Theorem 1 hold) and the last equality from the fact that the non price setters’ profits are independent of
rivals’ strategies. Hence, since this implies that Condition 2 of Theorem 1 does also hold, it must then be the case17
p0=2 arg max pPSi ðb^iÞ, so that
pPSi ðp^; b^iÞ4pPSi ðp0; b^iÞ ¼ pPSi ðp0; b0iÞZpPSi ðp^; b0iÞ,
where the last inequality from the fact that p0 2 arg max pPSi ðb0iÞ. Thus, pPSi ðp^; b^iÞ4pPSi ðp^; b0iÞ or equivalently,
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However, integral above cannot be positive. If qiðp^; b0iÞ ¼ qiðp^; b^iÞ, integral above is zero. If qiðp^; b0iÞ4qiðp^; b^iÞ, be
some bidder j bids units above marginal costs, then p^Zciðqiðp^; b0iÞÞ implies that the integral is negative. (c) Fina
qiðp^; b0iÞoqiðp^; b^iÞ then some bidder j bids units below marginal costs at b0i. Since such units are dispatched und
bidding them below marginal costs is ruled out by weak dominance so that qiðp^; b0iÞoqiðp^; b^iÞ cannot ho
equilibrium. Since integral above cannot be positive we ran into a contradiction proving that p04 p^ must also b
equilibrium when firms j bid at marginal costs as it satisfies the three conditions in Theorem 1. Last, by the
arguments as above, the equilibrium with p0 Pareto dominates the equilibrium with p^.
We now prove (i). The [If] part is trivial, so we omit it. [Only If] For the sake of contradiction, suppose tha
equilibrium in which firm i is the price setter at pn ¼ pPSi ðciÞ while all other firms bid at marginal costs does not exist
must be because Condition 3 fails to hold, given that Conditions 1 and 2 trivially hold. If there is multiple p
maximizing prices any other price pn 2 arg max pPSi ðciÞopPSi ðciÞ would also violate Condition 3, given that pPSi ðc
assumed to be the largest one. To show that there does not exist any other equilibrium in which firm i is the price s
argue by contradiction and suppose that some other bid profile b0 constitutes an equilibrium. If p0opPSi ðciÞ then Cond
3 will again fail to hold contradicting that it constitutes an equilibrium, whereas if p04pPSi ðciÞ then p0 must al
sustainable when the non price setters bid at marginal costs as shown in (ii). The contradiction proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us first introduce the following piece of notation. For xnZxj ¼ 0, let x0n be the smallest am
of contracts held by firm n for which the equilibrium in which firm n sets the price does not exist. Formally,
x0n  minfxn : xn 2 ½0,qcn and pNPSj ðpPSn ðxnÞÞopPSj ðpPSj ð0ÞÞ for some jg:
(i) By construction, pPS1 ð0Þ is the highest candidate equilibrium price at the no contracts case, and Corollary 1 guara
that it is an equilibrium price. Since pPS1 ðx1Þ is weakly decreasing in x1, the highest equilibrium price when x14
maxfpPS1 ðx1Þ,pPS2 ð0ÞgrpPS1 ð0Þ. Hence, the highest equilibrium price is (weakly) higher at the no contracts case. To show
the lowest equilibrium price is also (weakly) higher at the no contracts case, let pPSi ð0Þ be the lowest equilibrium
when x1 ¼ 0: By Corollary 2, any price pPSn ð0ÞZpPSi ð0Þ, for 1onr i, must also be an equilibrium price when x1 ¼ 0 as w
when x140. The incentives of all firms other than firm 1 do not depend on x1, whereas firm 1’s incentives to deviate
an equilibrium in which firm n sets the price are decreasing in x1; hence, if no firm deviates from pPSn ð0Þ when x1 ¼
firm will deviate either when x140. It thus follows that the lowest equilibrium price when x140 cannot be larger
pPSi ð0Þ. Therefore, since the set of equilibrium prices is the same when x1 ¼ 0 or x140, except (possibly) for the hi
price, which is higher when x1 ¼ 0, and the lowest(s) price(s) which is (possibly) lower when x140, contracts by fi
only (weakly) reduce prices.
Let us now show that there can exist a non monotonic relationship between contracts awarded to firm 1
equilibrium prices. Since pPS1 ð0Þ is an equilibrium price when x1 ¼ 0, while when x1 ¼ qc1 it is not (since pPS1 ðqc1Þrpcop
firm 2 would trivially deviate from such a low price), there exists x01 2 ð0,qc1 such that the equilibrium with pPS1 ðx1Þ doe
exist for all x1 2 ½x01,qc1. Let pPSj ð0Þ be the lowest equilibrium price when x1 ¼ x01. By Corollary 2, it must be the case
pPS1 ðx01ÞopPSj ð0Þ as otherwise pPS1 ðx01Þ would also be an equilibrium. Thus, if pPS1 ðx1Þ is close enough to pPS1 ðx01Þ for x1 sli
below x01, then equilibrium prices go up as x1 approaches x
0
1. Note that such non monotonicity need not always arise,
for x1 slightly below x01, p
PS
1 ðx1ÞZpPSj ð0Þ.
(ii) Let us allocate all contracts to firm i. Since pPSi ð0Þ is the lowest equilibrium price at the no contracts case, by Coroll
equilibrium prices are fpPS1 ð0Þ, . . . ,pPSi1ð0Þ,pPSi ð0Þg. Existence of x0i 2 ð0,qci  is guaranteed by monotonicity, since pPSi ð0Þ
equilibrium price while pPSi ðqci ÞrpcopPS1 ð0Þ is not (firm 1 would trivially deviate from such a low price). Now, as pPSi ðxiÞ is
increasing in xi, allocating contracts xi 2 ð0,x0iÞ to firm i leads to (weakly) lower prices as compared to the no contracts ca
equilibrium prices are fpPS1 ð0Þ, . . . ,pPSi1ð0Þ,pPSi ðxiÞg and pPSi ð0ÞZpPSi ðxiÞ. However, allocating contracts xi 2 ½x0i,qci  yiel
(weakly) higher prices, as equilibrium prices are fpPS1 ð0Þ, . . . ,pPSi1ð0Þg and pPSi ð0ÞrpPSi1ð0Þ. Note that allocating contracts
firm i does not give rise to new equilibria in which firms n4 i set prices, as at least firm 1 would deviate from such equi
It follows that there exists a (weak) non monotonic relationship between contract volume and equilibrium prices
contracts are awarded to firm i.
Similar arguments would imply that if all contracts are awarded to some firm 1ono i, there exists x0n 2 ð0,qcnÞ such
equilibrium prices are fpPS1 ð0Þ, . . . ,pPSn ðxnÞ, . . . ,pPSi ð0Þg for xnox0n and fpPS1 ð0Þ, . . . ,pPSn1ð0Þ,pPSnþ1ð0Þ, . . . ,pPSi ð0Þg for xn
Contracts xnox0n thus lead to (weakly) lower prices, but the effect of contracts xnZx0n depends on which equilibri
chosen, given that pPSi ð0ÞrpPSn ð0ÞrpPS1 ð0Þ.
(iii) Since for n4 i, pPSn ð0Þ is not an equilibrium price at the no contracts case, it follows that x0n ¼ 0. Consequently, fo
xnZ0, pPSn ðxnÞrpPSn ð0Þ, so that by Corollary 2, pPSn ðxnÞ cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Hence, prices remain the sam
in the no contracts case. &18
Proof of Lemma 6. Since marginal costs are zero, pPSi ðxiÞ ¼ arg maxpfp½DðpÞ Kj xig for i¼ 1;2. It follows from the implicit
function theorem that pPSi ðxiÞ is decreasing in xi and Kj. Thus, K14K2 and x240¼ x1 imply pPS1 ð0Þ4pPS2 ð0Þ4pPS2 ðx2Þ. Similarly,
since pPS1 ð0Þ is increasing in a and it is independent of x2, whereas pPS2 ðx2Þ is decreasing in a and x2, it follows that pPS1 ð0Þ
pPS2 ðx2Þ40 is increasing in a and x2. Last, from pPS1 ð0Þ4pPS2 ðx2Þ, it follows that the equilibrium with pPS1 ð0Þ exists for all a
llows
ld be
viate.
PS
2 ð0Þg
on to
ition
.005.
9–404.
nomic
arkets.
h spot
.
rnal of
rnal of
. 4590.
nomic
ics 22,
ve We(Corollary 1).
We need to show that there exists baðx2Þ above which the equilibrium with pPS2 ðx2Þ does not exist. At x2 ¼ 0 it fo
trivially that bað0Þ ¼Dð0Þ=K41=2. To see this just note that for aZDð0Þ=K , the residual demand faced by firm 2 wou
non positive, DðpÞ K1oDð0Þ aKr0. Since pPS2 ð0Þ ¼ pc ¼ 0, firm 2 cannot be a price setter as firm 1 would rather de
In contrast, for any aobað0Þ ¼Dð0Þ=K , we have that pNPS1 ðpPS2 ð0ÞÞ pPS1 ðpPS1 ð0ÞÞ ¼ pPS2 ð0Þ½K DðpPS1 ð0ÞÞ40 so that fpPS1 ð0Þ,p
are both equilibrium prices.
For x240, firm 2 cannot be the price setter for any aZbaðx2Þ, where baðx2Þ is implicitly defined as the soluti
pNPS1 ðpPS2 ðx2ÞÞ ¼ pPS1 ðpPS1 ð0ÞÞ, i.e.,
aKpPS2 ðx2Þ ¼ ½DðpPS1 ð0ÞÞ ð1 aÞKpPS1 ð0Þ,
with both pPS2 ð0Þ and pPS2 ðx2Þ depending on a. For any a4baðx2Þ firm 2 cannot be the price setter as the necessary cond
in Theorem 1 (point 3) would not be satisfied. Finally, baðx2Þ is decreasing in x2 as pPS2 ðx2Þ is decreasing in x2. &
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.11
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